ABSTRACT In this paper, we propose a polarization filtering-based transmission scheme to enhance the physical layer security in the dual-polarized satellite communication. To prevent eavesdropping, this paper first divides the information sequence into two parts and modulates them independently. Subsequently, a pair of dual polarization states (PSs) is selected to carry the two modulated signals based on the designed selection rule. Last but not least, two polarized signals are added up and transmitted by the orthogonally dual-polarized antenna. Based on the assumption that the selection rule of the dual polarization states is synchronous among the legitimate users, the legitimate users can separate the two polarized signals by polarization filtering (PF). After that, the polarization match is performed to the two polarized signals, respectively. Then according to the demodulation rule, the information can be recovered. However, the eavesdropper does not know the PS selection rule and could not separate the two signals. Therefore, it is impossible for the eavesdropper to recover any useful information so that the security can be enhanced. In addition, the PSs of the signals will be changed due to the polarization dependent loss effect of the satellite channel, which leads to the PF performance degradation. To tackle this problem, a zero-forcing pre-filter is utilized at the receiver side. Finally, the security performance is validated by the theoretical analysis and simulation results in the dual-polarized satellite systems.
I. INTRODUCTION
Currently, the throughput of satellite systems should be increased in order to meet the ever-increasing data demands. Furthermore, recent works have proved that multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) is a promising way to increase the spectral efficiency by utilizing multiple antennas at both transmitters and receivers [1] , [2] . Nonetheless, the MIMO technique applied in satellite communications is different from the terrestrial one, where the transmitter can obtain the channel state information (CSI) via the training sequences sent by users [3] , while in satellite communications, it is difficult to update the CSI in time due to the long distance of communication. By the time the satellite receives the feedback parameters, the CSI may have been changed. Therefore, the transmission techniques which do not require CSI have grown increasingly popular.
Furthermore, satellite scenarios make the spatial components become correlate at the receiver side due to the Line of Sight (LOS). Without sufficient scatters, the receiver can only discover a signal transmission path due to the insufficient sensitivity to distinguish the different spatial signatures. Thus, the MIMO gains are hardly available [4] . Conversely, The co-located orthogonally dual-polarized antenna (ODPA) has become a low cost and space effective configuration and the usage of dual-polarized antenna in the satellite communication has been increasingly motivated by the new possible applications, together with the newest standards, including dual-polarized MIMO [5] , [6] . By utilizing the ODPA, the capacity of the satellite system can be improved since polarization provides the additional degrees of freedom for information transmission [7] . In addition, the amplitude ratio and phase difference between the two orthogonally polarized branch signals can be utilized to deliver the polarization domain information. Thus, a lot of advanced techniques can be designed, such as the polarization-based modulation techniques [3] , [8] , [9] , the polarization multiple access technique [6] , the polarization-based signal sensing technique [10] , the multidimensional constellation design technique [11] and the polarization filtering technique [12] .
On the other hand, security is a fundamental problem in the dual-polarized satellite communication due to the open nature of the wireless medium and its wide beam coverage, which make it difficult to shield the transmitted signals from the unintended recipients [13] . Transmission security traditionally depends on cryptographic techniques in the link and network layer [14] . The challenges (and vulnerabilities) associated with the key distribution and management, however, make cryptography a less ideal solution. New researches on physical layer security have pointed out that a positive secret rate can be guaranteed when the legitimate users have a higher signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) than the eavesdroppers based on the information theory [15] . Nonetheless, it is not always the case in the dual-polarized satellite communication, since there is no extra degree of freedom for beamforming or designing artificial noise in order to improve the secret rate [16] . To enhance the security performance, in [17] , a method based on polarization modulation and weighted fractional Fourier transform (PM-WFRFT) is proposed, where the confidential message is concealed in the polarization state (PS) of the carrier. By randomly changing the WFRFT order, the signals are difficult to be detected and the constellation is distorted at the eavesdropper side. In [18] , a fast dual polarization hopping (FDPH) approach is proposed, in which two PSs are used to carry the same signals. By randomly selecting the PSs, the signals vary randomly at the receiver side. Based on the assumption that the polarization hopping pattern is synchronous among the legitimate users, the eavesdropper cannot recover any useful information. However, since one of the polarized signal is useless for the legitimate users, about half of the transmitting power is wasted.
In this paper, we put forward a polarization filtering based transmission scheme to enhance the physical layer security (PF-PHY) in dual-polarized satellite communications. Firstly, the information sequence is divided into two parts, which are modulated independently with modulation techniques like Phase Shift Keying (PSK), Pulse Amplitude Modulation (PAM), and Quadrature Amplitude Modulation (QAM). Subsequently, so as to prevent eavesdropping, a pair of dual polarization states are selected based on the designed selection rule to carry the two modulated signals, respectively. Finally, two modulated signals are added up and transmitted by the ODPA. For the legitimate user, with the selection rule, two signals can be separated completely by the method of polarization filtering (PF). Subsequently, according to the demodulation rule, the information can be recovered. For the eavesdropper, it is almost impossible to separate the two signals without knowing the PS selection rule. Thereby, the received signals are random complex numbers which cannot be demodulated, thus the transmission security is enhanced. In addition, the PSs of the received signal are always different from those of the transmit signals due to the polarization dependent loss effect (PDL), which is ascribed to the non-ideal cross-polarization discrimination (XPD) of the receiver antenna as well as the complex electromagnetic environment. To address this problem, the zero-forcing pre-filter (ZFPF) is used at the receiver side to process the received signals before PF. More specifically, main contributions are summarized as below:
1. In the PF-PHY scheme, two signals with different PSs are utilized to carry the information, which is different from the FDPH method in [18] , where the same signal with different PSs is used to carry the information. With the same modulation technique and transmitting power, the transmission efficiency of PF-PHY is about twice than that of FDPH.
2. The PSs of two modulated signals are controlled by the designed selection rule, which is synchronous among the legitimate users. Thereby, the signals can be separated by the legitimate users with the PF method. In the PF-PHY scheme, modulation techniques like PSK, QAM, and PAM can be directly used to modulate the signals, while PSK cannot be directly used in the FDPH system. The secure performance is evaluated in terms of the bit error rate (BER).
3. In the PF-PHY scheme, the ZFPF method is utilized to solve the PDL effect, which is different from the pre-compensation (PC) method in FDPH. By utilizing the ZFPF method, we just have to calculate the ZFPF matrix during every channel estimation interval. However, if the PC method is used, it is necessary to calculate the precompensation matrix at the symbol rate, which needs more calculations. In addition, in the ZFPF method, CSI is estimated at the receiver side, which is more practical in satellite scenarios.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II, the system model will be introduced, and then the polarization dependent loss of the satellite channel and the blind signal demodulation method will be described, respectively. In Section III, the principle of the PF-PHY scheme will be described in detail. Simulation results will be presented in Section IV. Finally, Section V will provide a conclusion of this paper.
Notations: The superscript T and H are used to denote the transpose and the Hermitian transpose of a vector or matrix. Vectors and matrices are represented by bold lowercase or uppercase. Eq. (a) denotes the equation (a).
II. SYSTEM MODEL
Assuming a satellite scenario with three participants: a transmitter Alice, a legitimate receiver Bob and an eavesdropper Eve as shown in Fig. 1 . In order to transmit or receive the polarized signals, all of them are equipped with a dualpolarized antenna. As the signals are broadcast from Alice to the two receivers, the eavesdropper can recover the same information as Bob, thus the information is eavesdropped. To prevent eavesdropping, we proposed a secure transmission method based on polarization filtering in this study. 
A. SIGNAL MODEL AND POLARIZATION DEPENDENT LOSS OF THE SATELLITE CHANNEL
The polarized signal represented by Jones vector can be written as [19] 
where γ ∈ 0, π 2 is the amplitude relationship (or polarized angle) between the orthogonal dual-polarized components; η ∈ [0, 2π ] denotes the difference of them in phase; w c is the carrier frequency; A k e jϕ k denotes the amplitude-phase modulation signal and the polarization state (PS) is defined as P : (γ , η).
At the receiver side, the received signal can be represented as
where n is the noise vector with the probability density function (PDF) as CN 0, σ 2 E 2×2 ; E denotes the identity matrix; H denotes the satellite channel impulse response matrix, which can be further written as
where ϒ is the power fading of the non-polarized channel and √ λ i , i = 1, 2 denote eigenvalues; U, V are unitary matrixes. Then, Eq. (2) can be further written as
tan γ and p is the normalization power factor as
For a better understanding of the PDL effect, we utilize a constellation point P j to illustrate the polarization transformation in Eq. (4). As shown in Fig. 2 on the Poincare ball [20] , where 2γ and η denote the length of the arc from P j to the horizontal PS P H and the angle between this arc and the equator respectively. Affected by V, P j : (γ , η) rotates around P H with the radius 2γ , which results in P m : (γ ,η) without changing its power. This is because U is a unitary matrix and it creates lossless polarization transfer. Then affected by , it moves toward P H as is shown by P g : (γ ,η) and its power changes into p. Finally, affected by U, it rotates around P H with the radius 2γ and results in P f : (γ ,η) without changing its power. If H is an ideal channel with λ 1 = λ 2 = 1, then P j = P f . Nevertheless, H is always non-ideal due to the below reasons: 1. The cross-polarization discrimination (XPD) of the dualpolarized antenna at the receiver side is not large enough to ensure h 12 = h 21 = 0.
2. The complex electromagnetic environment, including the existing varieties of clouds, rain and small ice crystals in the air, will cause signal reflection, diffraction and diffuse scattering.
Consequently, the PSs of the received signal are always different from the transmit ones in most of the satellite scenarios. This is the polarization dependent loss effect (PDL), which can be defined as PDL = 10 log 10
Although the PS is changed due to the PDL effect, we can still recover the information by the blind signal demodulation method, which will be described in the following part.
B. BLIND SIGNAL DEMODULATION
The block diagram of blind signal demodulation is shown in Fig. 3 Based on Eq. (2), the receivers can recover the polarization parameters (γ R , η R ) by
where is the phase acquisition function. Then after the polarization match, the received signal can be represented as If the noise effect is ignored, according to Eq. (4) and Eq. (7), we can find γ R =γ , η R =η, then
Thus, in the satellite scenarios, it can be found that the polarization characteristics of the received signals are always different from the transmit ones due to the PDL effect. Although the polarization characteristics are changed, all the receivers can still recover the information based on the blind signal demodulation method.
III. PRINCIPLE OF THE PF-PHY SCHEME A. TRANSMITTER MODEL
As analyzed in the last section, even the PS of the signal is randomly changed at the symbol rate, it cannot prevent eavesdropping. Thus, in this section, the information is divided into two parts and two different PSs are assigned to them. Then, both of the two parts are added up and transmitted by the dual-polarized antenna. By randomly changing the PSs at the symbol rate, the transmission security can be realized.
The block diagram of the transmitter is presented in Fig. 4 . At first, the information sequence I O is divided into I x and I l by the Data Rate Allocation Unit (DRAU). Subsequently, both of them are modulated by the traditional modulation (TM) techniques, which yields K symbols: x k , l k , k = 1, 2, · · · , K . Later, K pairs of different PSs are assigned to them, respectively. Finally, the two polarized signals are added together and send to the radio frequency unit (RF). After that, the composite signal is transmitted out by the horizontally-polarized antenna (H) and vertically-polarized antenna (V). 
B. POLARIZATION FILTERING AT THE RECEIVER SIDE UNDER THE IDEAL GAUSS CHANNEL
If the channel is ideal, the received signal can be represented as 
From Eq. (10), it is found that signals cannot be directly demodulated with the usage of Eq. (7) and in order to demodulate the received signal, two polarized signals should be firstly separated. Polarization filtering (PF) is a mature technology and used to solve the problems of signal separation, which are difficult to process in the time, frequency and spatial domains [12] .
To illustrate the principle of polarization filtering, we assume two Jones vectors
Then, the oblique projection operator for polarization filtering can be represented as
where
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Then based on Eq. (10), the below can be obtained
j w c t+ϕ k
From Eq. (14), it is found that two signals are separated.
C. POLARIZATION STATE SELECTION
Although two signals are separated, it is noteworthy that the noise power is changed after processed by PF, which can be denoted as (we take Q P k x |P k l n for an example and the analysis is the same for
where ξ is the principal angle between the subspace of P k x and P k l on the Poincare sphere [19] . As sin 2 ξ ≤ 1, the noise is amplified by PF. Indeed, the relationship between the output SNR and the input SNR can be described as line joining them can pass through the center of the sphere, such as the pairs (P 1 , P 2 ), (P 3 , P 4 ). In this way, the noise power is not amplified. Therefore, in the PF-PHY scheme, the PSs can be generated by the following steps:
1. Generate two independent pseudo-random sequences based on the method in [21] , such as PN1, PN2.
2. PN1 is used to determine the polarization angle γ k x ∈ 0, π 2 and PN2 is used to determine η k x ∈ (0, 2π ). 3. Once a PS P k x : γ k x , η k x is chosen, its orthogonal polarization state P k l can be obtained by:
The legitimate user Bob is aware of the PS selection rule, during each symbol period, the PSs P k x and P k l are selected at the transmitter to carry the traditional modulation signals. Then, at the receiver side, the same PSs P k x and P k l can be selected to form the polarization filters to separate the two transmit signals. However, the eavesdropper does not know the rule and it is impossible to intercept and capture from the received signal. Hence, it is almost impossible to separate two signals.
D. DEPOLARIZATION ELIMINATION
Under the ideal channel condition, the polarized signals can be separated by PF. Nonetheless, the polarization characteristic of the transmit signal will be changed due to the PDL effect of the satellite channel as illustrated in section II-A. Thus, although Bob knows the PS selection rule, it is still impossible to completely separate two signals [10] .
In order to solve the PDL effect, previous works mainly emphasize on the pre-compensation method based on the estimated channel state information (CSI) at the transmitter side [18] , [20] , [22] . For instance, for P k x (the precompensation matrix of P k l can be calculated in the same way by changing the polarization parameters), the precompensation matrix can be calculated by
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Although the pre-compensation method can prevent the distortion of the PSs, it will cause power attenuation [22] . In addition, the pre-compensation matrix for both signals should be updated at the symbol rate, which requires a large amount of calculation. Moreover, it may not be the case to timely update the CSI at the transmitter side in the satellite scenarios due to the long communication distance. Thus, in the PF-PHY scheme, the CSI is estimated at the receiver side and a zero-forcing pre-filter (ZFPF) is applied before PF [23] , which is equivalent to applying the filter
where G denotes the estimated CSI and we assume G = H.
As the channel estimation is not the main theme in our research, it is omitted here and we assume the perfect CSI at the receiver side. The signals after processing can be denoted as:ȳ
. It is easy to prove that the PDFs are [24] n k 1 ∼ CN 0,
According to Eq. (23), it is easy to find that the noise power is amplified. Based on the ZFPF method, the depolarization effect is eliminated and we just have to update the ZFPF matrix during every channel estimation interval, instead of the symbol rate in the pre-compensation method. In addition, the CSI is estimated at the receiver side, which is more practical in satellite scenarios. Finally, the block diagram of the receiver designed for Bob is presented in Fig. 7 . After sampling and filtering, the PDL effect is firstly eliminated based on the ZFPF method. Subsequently, by utilizing the PSs of the two polarized signals, which are strictly synchronous with the transmitter, the two signals s x (t) , s l (t) are separated. After that, the polarization match is applied to obtain the modulation signals for recovering the original input information.
E. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this paper, we consider a more practical model that both the legitimate receiver Bob and the eavesdropper Eve can accurately obtain the CSI. Thus Eve can also apply the ZFPF method to eliminate the PDL effect. Then, ignore the effect of the noise, according to Eq. (17), for Eve, the received signal can be denoted as 
As Eve does not know the PSs of the polarized signals, it is almost impossible to separate the two polarized signals. If the eavesdropper adopts the blind signal demodulation method as discussed in II-B, the polarization parameters are Then, we analyze the security performance in two special conditions:
1. For I x and I l , we use the constant modulus modulation technique like PSK, and we also assume their modulation order are the same. Then, A k x = A k l , we can derive
Under this condition, both γ k ER and η k ER vary randomly. According to Eq. (26), y k E (t) is a random complex number, therefore, the blind signal demodulation method does not work.
2. For I x and I l , we use the amplitude modulation technique like PAM, and we also assume their modulation order are the same. Then φ k x = φ k l = 0, the below can be derived:
Then, the received signal can be written as
Similarly, the blind signal demodulation does not work either. Although η k x can be gotten, it makes little sense for the information is conveyed by the amplitude of both two polarized signals. In addition, it is also impossible for Eve to separate the two signals by PF for γ k ER varies randomly. For other modulation technique combinations, the security performance can be analyzed in the same way and the same conclusion can be obtained. So, in the PF-PHY scheme, the modulation techniques can be chosen freely, unlike the method in [18] , where PSK should be avoided.
IV. NUMERICAL SIMULATION RESULTS
In our simulations, two modulated signals are represented by s x and s l . The transmitter designed for Alice and the receiver designed for Bob are respectively presented in Fig. 4 and Fig. 7 , respectively. In addition, we only consider the case that the information about the modulation techniques applied in s x and s l are open to the eavesdropper Eve. This is because the case we considered is a worse one, if Eve can not demodulate the signals with these information, he can not either without these information. As Eve can not obtain the PSs of two signals, in order to demodulate the signals, blind signal demodulation method is adopted and the result after polarization match is used to recover both two signals. 
A. SECURITY PERFORMANCE WITH DIFFERENT MODULATION TECHNIQUES UNDER IDEAL GAUSS CHANNEL
To evaluate the performance of the PF-PHY scheme, an ideal Gauss channel is assumed, thus there is no PDL effect. At first, a random bit sequence is generated and divided into two parts I x and I l . Subsequently, different modulation techniques are utilized to modulate the two bit sequences. The PSs are selected as described in III-C. The BER curves are shown in Fig. 8-Fig. 11 .
4PSK is firstly utilized to modulate both I x and I l , which results in s x and s l . Then, their BER curves at Bob and Eve are respectively plotted. After that, we change the modulation order and utilize 8PSK to perform the same operation. The BER curves versus the bit SNR are shown in Fig. 8 , it is found that the BERs of both s x and s l at Bob are almost the same as the theoretical values under the Gauss channel. This is because s x and s l are completely separated by PF at Bob. And based on the PS selection method, the noise is not amplified. However, Eve exhibits high BERs for both two signals at arbitrary SNR and modulation order.
In Fig. 9 and Fig. 10 , PSK is replaced with PAM and QAM, respectively. Then, the same operations are performed. In Fig. 11 , we utilize different modulation techniques to modulate I x and I l (16QAM for I x and QPSK for I l ). In all these conditions, the similar results can be obtained that the BER curves of s x and s l at Bob are almost the same as the theoretical values, while Eve exhibits high BERs. Therefore, based on the PF-PHY scheme, Eve can hardly extract any useful information, thus the security can be enhanced. [18] In the FDPH method, two PSs for the k-th signal can be denoted as
B. SECURITY PERFORMANCE COMPARISON WITH THE FDPH METHOD IN
Hence, the received signal can be represented as
where γ k S ∈ 0, π 8 is the same interval as the parameter setting in [18] . For the eavesdropper Eve, the blind demodulated polarization parameters are π 4 , η k S , after the polarization match is performed, the output signals can be denoted as
From Eq. (31), It can be found that the amplitude varies randomly due to the fast hopping PS, while the phase does not change. Therefore, the modulation techniques like PSK are not applicable. In addition, we find that once PSK is used, the power of the signal is amplified due to
The simulation results are shown in Fig. 12 , it can be found that the BER of Bob in PF-PHY is almost the same as the theoretical values, while the BER of Bob in FDPH is a little worse, this is because the principle angle ξ is smaller than π 2 , which amplifies the noise power as shown in Fig. 5 . In addition, the BER of Eve in PF-PHY is higher, while BER of Eve in FDPH is better than the theoretical values. This is because after performing the polarization match, the signal power is amplified as shown in Eq. (32). This is the different result we obtained from the result in [18] .
When using other modulations, for Bob, we can obtain the similar results that the BER performance of the PF-PHY scheme outperforms that of the FDPH scheme. 
C. PDL ELIMINATION PERFORMANCE WITH NON-IDEAL GAUSS CHANNEL
This simulation tries to to compare the PDL elimination performance of the ZFPF method and the PC method. The statistical modeling of land mobile satellite channels [5] is utilized and the BER curves for Bob are plotted in Fig. 13 , where PDL = 3 dB. Two modulation techniques (QPSK and 8PSK) are used to modulate I x and I l , respectively. From Fig. 13 , it can be found that the BER performance of ZFPF is a little better than that of PC and both of them are a little worse than the theoretical values. This is because in the ZFPF method, the noise power is amplified and in the PC method, the signal's power decreases after being processed by the pre-compensation matrix. In addition, with the usage of the ZFPF method, we just have to calculate the channel matrix during every channel estimation interval, while if the PC method is utilized, the pre-compensation matrix should be updated at the symbol rate, which accounts more calculations. Furthermore, in the ZFPF method, CSI is estimated at the receiver side, which is more practical in satellite scenarios.
V. CONCLUSION
This paper puts forward a polarization filtering based transmission scheme to enhance the physical layer security in the dual-polarized satellite communication. The information sequence is transmitted by two different polarized signals at the same time, which has a higher transmission efficiency than the FDPH method. In the PF-PHY scheme, constant modulus modulation technique can be directly used to modulate the signals, while for FDPH, PSK only can be used with the time-varying channel. Finally, to eliminate the PDL effect, the ZFPF method is utilized, which requires less computation than the PC method and is more practical in satellite scenarios. 
